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Texas law continues to navigate through various litigation-related
franchising issues. Although this Survey period did not have any single
“blockbuster” development for franchise and distribution case law in
Texas, a number of cases were decided on frequently litigated issues in
Texas, including the scope and applicability of contractual arbitration
provisions, the interpretation of discretionary contract obligations, misap-
propriation of trade secrets as defined by the Texas Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, and the application of the economic loss rule to fraud and
misrepresentation claims. This Survey period produced many Texas cases
that continue to define and shape the franchise environment. These cases
highlight important considerations for contract drafters and litigators, in-
cluding procedural hurdles, early-dispute resolution, common law and




The mere fortuity that a party to a contract happens to be a Texas
resident, coupled with that party’s unilateral performance in the forum
state, is not enough to confer jurisdiction.1
That is what the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
made clear in United States v. Sims.2 In that case, the district court ad-
dressed both general and specific personal jurisdiction and, ultimately,
granted a franchisor’s special appearance and motion to dismiss.3 Defen-
* B.A., Colorado State University, 1974; M.A.T., The Colorado College, 1979; J.D.,
University of Texas at Austin School of Law, 1990. Partner, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dal-
las, Texas.
** B.B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1997; J.D., University of Texas at Austin
School of Law, 2002. Counsel, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Austin, Texas.
*** B.S., Texas Christian University, 2011; J.D., University of Oklahoma College of
Law, 2014. Associate, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
**** B.A., University of Mississippi, 2012; J.D., Tulane University Law School, 2015.
Associate, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
1. United States v. Sims, No. 4:17-CV-00495, 2017 WL 5441834, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 2017) (mem. op.).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id.
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dant and former football player Billy Sims (Sims) inspired the Billy Sims
BBQ franchised restaurants owned and operated by Legendary Q
Brands, LLC (Legendary).4 The franchised restaurants were located in
Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Colorado; there was one
franchised restaurant located in Texas for a period of time.5 As the face of
the franchise, Sims received various compensation for the use of his
name, image, and likeness.6 In 2017, the government filed suit to recover
outstanding tax assessments and to enforce federal tax liens on Sims’
property, his rights to payments from Legendary, and any rights Legen-
dary obtained from Sims to use his assets.7 The government also named
Legendary in the lawsuit due to Legendary’s interest in Sims’ personal
assets.8
Legendary moved to dismiss on the ground that the court did not have
personal jurisdiction over it.9 First, the district court analyzed whether it
could exercise general jurisdiction over Legendary, which requires “con-
tinuous and systematic” general contacts with Texas.10 The district court
found the facts did not establish sufficient ties to Texas for general per-
sonal jurisdiction to attach. Legendary had no office or any employee in
Texas, was not organized in Texas, and did not do business in Texas.11 The
district court acknowledged that the facts established that Legendary con-
ducted business in Texas through a franchise agreement with an
Oklahoma company for approximately a year, which the court found to
be insufficient minimum contacts to establish general jurisdiction.12
Next, the district court analyzed whether it could exercise specific per-
sonal jurisdiction over Legendary and likewise held that the facts did not
support specific jurisdiction. Legendary’s licensing agreement to use
Sims’ publicity rights for marketing the Billy Sims BBQ restaurants was
executed in Oklahoma and governed by Oklahoma law.13 “Merely con-
tracting with a resident of the forum state does not establish minimum
contacts,” and the choice-of-law provision in the licensing agreement in-
dicated that “Legendary did not intend to avail itself of the privileges of
doing business in Texas and believed that any dispute over the contract
would be resolved [in] Oklahoma.”14 “[T]he License Agreement did not
require Legendary to perform any of its obligations in Texas.”15 Finding
that Sims’ Texas location and Legendary’s payments to Sims (deposited
in Texas) were not enough to confer jurisdiction, the court granted Leg-
4. Id.
5. Id. at *1–2.
6. Id. at *1.




11. Id. at *5
12. Id. at *4.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *5 (citing Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. Oao Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir.
2007)).
15. Id. at *6.
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endary’s special appearance and motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed Legen-
dary from the case without prejudice.16
Sims serves as a useful reminder that general jurisdiction is very limited
and most likely only available over a corporate defendant in its place of
incorporation and principal place of business. As to specific jurisdiction,
the second avenue to personal jurisdiction, a contract with a Texas resi-
dent is not enough to establish minimum contacts. Nor is payment in
Texas.
B. FORUM SELECTION
Forum-selection clauses come in all shapes and sizes, and franchise
cases often involve prolonged discussion of where the litigation should
occur. The Dallas Court of Appeals recently considered the scope of a
broad forum-selection clause in In re Bambu Franchising, LLC.17 The
franchise relationship between the parties in that case was consummated,
in part, through a business agreement that contained the following forum
selection clause: “Any lawsuit relating to any matter arising under this
agreement shall be initiated in a State or Federal Court located in San
Jose, California.”18 The franchisee sued the franchisor for violations of
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the franchisor moved to
dismiss based on the forum selection clause.19 The trial court denied the
motion and the franchisor sought mandamus relief.20 While the fran-
chisee argued that its tort claims were not covered by the forum-selection
clause, the court of appeals disagreed after discussing the importance of
the language used in the forum selection clause: the use of the term
“shall” made the clause mandatory, and the use of the term “matter” as
opposed to “claim” signaled an agreement that the forum-selection clause
applied to matters beyond just breach of contract claims.21 Because the
franchisee’s extra-contractual claims emanated from the business agree-
ment, the court ordered the trial court to vacate its previous order and
grant the franchisor’s motion to dismiss.22 The court’s order demon-
strated that even an artful pleading cannot escape a broad mandatory
forum selection clause when the claims would not exist but for the exis-
tence of the agreement containing the clause.23
16. Id.
17. No. 05-17-00690-CV, 2017 WL 4003428 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 12, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
18. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *3.
22. Id. at *3–4.
23. Id. at *3.
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C. ARBITRATION
The importance of the interpretation and application of arbitration
provisions by Texas courts continues to grow in light of the increasing
number of franchise disputes settled through alternative dispute resolu-
tion. Nonetheless, Texas courts consistently enforce arbitration provisions
and apply the plain language of their terms.
In Charging Bison, LLC v. Interstate Battery Franchising & Dev., Inc.,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas addressed the
scope and applicability of a contractual arbitration provision. The parties’
franchise agreement required arbitration of “any claim or controversy
arising out of or relating to” the franchise agreement except “any claim or
dispute involving the propriety of any termination of [the franchise agree-
ment].”24 After several years of franchise operations, the franchisee noti-
fied the franchisor that it intended to terminate the franchise agreement
due, in part, to alleged misrepresentations in the Franchise Disclosure
Document.25 The franchisor then filed a demand for arbitration and
sought a declaration that the franchisee had “no basis to terminate the
franchise agreement.”26 The franchisee objected to arbitration and ar-
gued the franchise agreement specifically excluded the franchisor’s claim
from arbitration, but the arbitrator refused to stay the proceedings.27
The franchisee subsequently filed suit in state court to stay the arbitra-
tion under Section 171.023(c) of the Texas General Arbitration Act, and
argued that the anticipatory termination of the franchise agreement fell
under the exception to arbitration.28 The franchisor responded that the
arbitration exception only applied to the validity of an actual termination
and, since no termination had occurred, the exception did not apply.29
Further, the franchisor argued that the allegation of fraudulent induce-
ment clearly fell under the general arbitration provision, which applied to
all claims and disputes arising out of or relating to the franchise agree-
ment or the parties’ relationship.30 Focusing on the plain meaning of the
contract terms, the district court held that the arbitration exception did
not include an anticipatory termination of the franchise agreement.31 The
district court emphasized the policy reasons favoring arbitration and reit-
erated the general principle that all doubts concerning the scope of the
arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration.32 This case
illustrates that Texas courts continue to favor arbitration, particularly
24. Charging Bison, LLC v. Interstate Battery Franchising & Dev., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-
3476-G, 2017 WL 1296454, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2017) (mem. op.).
25. Id.
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *3.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *4.
32. Id.
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when the agreement between the parties includes a mandate (or explicit
exception).
In another case addressing a carve-out to an arbitration agreement, the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas denied a franchisee’s
motion to compel arbitration after the franchisor sought preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief.33 The franchisor had terminated the
franchise agreement and sought to enjoin the franchisee from using and
infringing on its trademarks. While the franchise agreement’s arbitration
provision covered all claims and disputes arising out of or related to the
agreement, it specifically excluded “temporary or preliminary injunctive
relief . . . that may be necessary to protect [franchisor’s] Proprietary
Marks or other rights or property.”34
The district court first had to address who must determine the arbi-
trability of the franchisor’s claim.35 The franchisee argued it was the arbi-
trator; the franchisor argued it was the court.36 Even though the
agreement did not expressly delegate the question to the arbitrator, it
adopted the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Commercial
Rules of Arbitration to govern any arbitration proceedings, which ex-
pressly granted the arbitrator power to rule on his or her jurisdiction or
the arbitrability of any claim.37 The district court acknowledged the Fifth
Circuit’s prior holding that “the adoption of the AAA rules to govern
arbitration proceedings ‘presents clear and unmistakable evidence that
the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitratbility,’” but it concluded the gen-
eral rule did not apply “when the agreement contains an express exclu-
sion to the arbitration clause.”38 As a result, the district court examined
whether the injunctive relief sought related to the franchisor’s trademarks
and non-compete agreement fell within the exclusion clause of the arbi-
tration provision.39 The district court held that it did and pointed to the
broad language of the exclusion, which provided for injunctive relief re-
lated to the protection of franchisor’s marks or “other rights or
property.”40
In Prescription Health Network, LLC v. Adams, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals refused a franchisor’s request to vacate, modify, or correct an
arbitration judgment under the Federal Arbitration Act.41 After the fran-
chisees filed suit in Texas state court asserting various tort and contract
claims, the franchisor successfully moved to compel arbitration based on
33. Stockade Cos., LLC v. Kelly Rest. Grp., LLC, No. A-17-CV-143 RP, 2017 WL
1968328 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2017).
34. Id. at *2.
35. Id. at *2–3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *3.
38. Id. (citing Cooper v. WestEnd Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir.
2016)).
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id. at *4–5.
41. Prescription Health Network, LLC v. Adams, No. 02-15-00279-CV, 2017 WL
1416875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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the franchise agreement’s arbitration clause. A three-member arbitration
panel heard the dispute and found that the franchisees owed damages,
but the panel offset the franchisor’s recovery due to its violation of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and breach of a related
agreement between the parties.42 The panel also awarded the franchisees
their attorneys’ fees and costs.43
In its motion to modify or vacate the award, the franchisor argued that
the panel “acted with ‘manifest disregard of the law,’ ‘exceeded their
powers,’ or awarded damages on a matter not presented to them.”44 Spe-
cifically, the franchisor complained of the panel’s decision to apply Texas
law to the tort claims yet nevertheless found the franchisor violated a
Florida statute. It also complained of the panel’s decision to award attor-
neys’ fees and costs to the franchisees even though the panel awarded
actual damages to the franchisor.45 The state trial court confirmed the
judgment, and the franchisor appealed.46 The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals confirmed the trial court’s judgment and held the arbitration panel
did not exceed its powers (i.e. deciding a matter not before them) to war-
rant disturbing the award.47 In reaching its decision, the court noted that
(1) the franchise agreement expressly allowed the parties to submit de-
ceptive trade practices claims under both Texas and Florida law; and (2)
the franchisee was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs despite the fact the
franchisor prevailed on eight of its ten claims.48 This result not only re-
flects Texas courts’ continuing deference to arbitration awards, but it also
highlights that a “manifest disregard of the law” does not justify vacating
an award under the Federal Arbitration Act.49
II. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION,
AND NONRENEWAL
Courts in Texas continue to afford great deference to agency decisions
in the franchise context. In Sweeten Truck Center, L.C. v. Volvo Trucks
North America, a franchisor sought to modify a franchise agreement
shrinking the franchisee’s geographic area of responsibility (AOR) from
twenty-four to thirteen counties.50 After Volvo notified the dealer of its
intention to modify the dealer’s AOR, the dealer filed a protest with the
Board of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Board).51 The admin-
istrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposal for decision with findings of
fact and conclusions of law after a six-day contested hearing and recom-
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *1.
47. Id. at *3–7.
48. Id. at *4, *6–7.
49. Id. at *3–4.
50. Sweeten Truck Ctr., L.C. v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., No. 1:15-CV-0085, 2016 WL
4979826, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
51. Id.
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mended that Volvo’s modification of the franchise agreement be granted.
The franchisee filed a protest with the Texas Department of Motor Vehi-
cles pursuant to the Texas Occupations Code and ultimately the ALJ ap-
proved the franchisor’s modification of the franchise agreement and the
Board approved.52 On appeal to the Austin Court of Appeals, the fran-
chisee argued that the Board improperly concentrated on past data in-
stead of the current circumstances, but the court noted the relevant Texas
Occupations Code statute required the consideration of historical data.53
In addition, the court held that the Board did not improperly consider
past data and properly considered other factors such as recent data and
the impact of new dealerships.54 The court’s decision demonstrates the
difficulty that parties face in attempting to change an administrative deci-
sion in the franchise context.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In the wake of the enactment of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act
and its preemption provision, Texas courts have increasingly focused on
misappropriation of trade secrets claims.55 In TeamLogic, Inc. v. Mere-
dith Group IT, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas held that the franchisor successfully stated a claim against its fran-
chisees for misappropriation of trade secrets and denied franchisees’ mo-
tion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).56 Franchisees claimed the franchisor
failed to demonstrate any of its property qualified as a trade secret or the
use or disclosure of any trade secrets without consent.57 The franchisor
alleged that franchisees had improperly used or disclosed its “operating
systems, compilations of information, customer names and contract infor-
mation, business strategies, product structure, customer utilization data,
pricing, marketing materials, tradenames, trade secrets, and trade-
marks.”58 The franchisor also alleged that the franchisees did not stop a
subsequent IT business owned by one of the franchisees’ employees (the
principal’s son) “from using [the franchise’s] proprietary information and
trade secrets.”59 Finally, the franchisor alleged that one franchisee’s prin-
cipal strung along the franchise by acting like she was going to renew the
franchise so that they could avoid transitioning clients to another
franchise and funnel those clients to her son’s business.60 The district
52. Id.
53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *3–4.
55. See 360 Mortg. Grp., LLC v. Homebridge Fin. Servs., Inc., No. A-14-CA-00847-SS,
2016 WL 900577, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2016) (holding that some traditional tort claims
related to trade secrets may be preempted by the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act when
the facts of the claim are the same as the claim for misappropriation of trade secrets); see
also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.007(a) (West 2017).
56. TeamLogic, Inc. v. Meredith Grp. IT, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2542-BH, 2017 WL
1837114, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2017) (mem. op.).
57. Id. at *6.
58. Id. at *7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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court held these allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) for misappropriation of trade secrets.61
In Stockade Companies, LLC v. Kelly Restaurant Group, LLC, the
franchisor asked the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
to enjoin a former franchisee from: (1) “using [its] confidential informa-
tion in violation of the parties’ [f]ranchise [a]greement” with respect to
the buffet system setup of the newly rebranded restaurants; (2) “misap-
propriating [its] trade secrets in violation of the Texas Uniform Trade
Secrets Act”; and (3) “infringing on [its] trade dress in violation of the
Lanham Act.”62 The district court had previously ordered the franchisee
to de-brand three franchise restaurants—Sirloin Stockade, Coyote Can-
yon, and Montana Mike’s—and the franchisee rebranded the restaurants
as Kansas Buffets.63
First, as to the buffet system,64 the district court held that given the
generally-known information of a buffet restaurant system and the plain-
tiff’s failure to demonstrate any direct evidence about the use of confi-
dential information, the plaintiff did not meet the burden to establish a
preliminary injunction.65 Second, with respect to the misappropriation of
trade secrets, the district court held that plaintiff failed to show the dis-
covery of any facts through an improper means and concluded that the
franchisor’s broad definition of “trade secret” was not sufficient to estab-
lish a preliminary injunction.66 Finally, because the franchise did not use
distinctive designs, decor, “color palette, furniture, exterior de´cor, or the
ratio of hot bars to cold bars,” the district court found that the trade dress
was not inherently distinctive.67
TeamLogic and Stockade underscore the importance of ensuring that
no intellectual property is disclosed or used after the termination of a
franchise. While the party claiming that a trade secret was misappropri-
ated bears the burden—usually the franchisor—the franchisee also has
clear obligations to protect the franchise’s intellectual property when
winding up the franchise. Franchisors and franchisees should take partic-
ular care when the franchisee intends to start operating a similar business.
61. Id.
62. Stockade Cos., LLC v. Kelly Rest. Grp., LLC, No. 1:17-CV-143-RP, 2017 WL
4640443, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
63. Id.
64. The franchisor’s claim was based on a breach of the franchise agreement, because
the franchisee was allegedly using the same “buffet system” including food, recipes, layout
design, de´cor, and specialty nights that the franchise used. Id. at *1–3.
65. Id. at *4–5.
66. Id. Evidence in the case reflected that defendant-franchisee no longer had access
to franchisor-plaintiff’s resource library and returned or otherwise disposed of other
materials that might constitute trade secrets. The party seeking an injunction for misappro-
priation of a trade secret must show that the trade secret was discovered through improper
means. Id. at *5.
67. Id. at *6.
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IV. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES—CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND FORMATION
In every franchise agreement, the franchisor and franchisee both prom-
ise to fulfill certain contractual obligations, but the satisfaction or failure
of those promises is not always clear. While the payment of royalties by a
specified date is a straight-forward question, other obligations such as the
franchisor’s “support” can be less clear and become a factual question for
the jury. In Armstrong v. Curves International, Inc. (Armstrong I), fran-
chisees operating eighty-three locations sued Curves International, Inc.
(Curves), the franchisor of thirty-minute fitness centers marketed to-
wards women, alleging that Curves’ misrepresentations induced them
into entering into franchise agreements and that Curves later breached
the franchise agreements.68 After dismissing many of the franchisees’
claims, the district court addressed the remaining claims for breach of
contract based on Curves’ alleged failure to provide franchisees the sup-
port promised in the franchise agreements.69 In its motion for summary
judgment, Curves argued the language of the franchise agreement
demonstrated it had complete discretion in how to perform the listed ser-
vices.70 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected
Curves’ arguments and denied Curves’ motion for summary judgment.
First, Curves argued it had sole discretion to determine what services to
perform and how to perform them because the franchise agreement did
“not require Curves to provide the ‘expected’ services.”71 Curves pointed
to a section in the franchise agreement that stated it “may” provide cer-
tain listed services and items.72 Curves added that it only agreed to “use
reasonable efforts to provide such services in a manner reasonably de-
signed for the Curves System, the content of and manner by which any
and all services are to be delivered by Curves are within Curves’ sole
reasonable discretion and right.”73
The district court rejected Curves’ first argument that there were other
bases for franchisees’ breach of contract claims and the argument would
render parts of the agreement illusory.74 Curves’ mandatory obligation to
“provide training classes” and “assist in developing all advertising materi-
als,” alone, precluded summary judgment.75 The district court determined
that the plain language of the franchise agreement requiring Curves “to
make available certain services to Franchisee and use reasonable efforts
to provide such services in a manner reasonably designed for the Curves
System” created an affirmative and non-discretionary obligation on
68. Armstrong v. Curves Int’l, Inc., No. 6:15-CV-294-RP, 2017 WL 894437 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 6, 2017).
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id. at *3–4.
71. Id. at *3.
72. Id. at *4.
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id. at *4.
75. Id.
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Curves “to make available certain services.”76 As such, the district court
examined whether this section of the franchise agreement was capable of
an alternative interpretation by “look[ing] at the [f]ranchise [f]greement
as a whole and attempt[ing] to harmonize its interpretation” with the rest
of the agreement.77 While another section of the franchise agreement
provided that the content and manner of the services were within Curves’
reasonable discretion, “simply because Curves has reasonable discretion
in the content and manner of the services it has agreed to provide does
not mean it can avoid providing a particular service altogether where it
would be unreasonable to do so.”78
The district court also rejected Curves’ second argument alleging the
franchise agreement entitled it to “Reasonable Business Judgment” in de-
ciding the manner in which it provided services and support to the fran-
chisees. First, the “Reasonable Business Judgment” provision only
applied to circumstances “involving or requiring Curves’ approval or con-
sent” and was thus inapplicable to the mandatory obligations alleged by
franchisees, such as those related to training and advertising.79 Second,
this provision did not preclude a breach of contract claim based on deci-
sions made pursuant to the business judgment rule.80 In the context of
corporate governance, the district court noted that the business judgment
rule does not protect officers and directors from all liability or breaches
of their fiduciary duty, such as bad faith breaches or self-dealing transac-
tions.81 The district court applied this rationale to the franchise relation-
ship and determined that the franchisees “must prove that actions taken
by Curves were unreasonable or not intended to benefit the Curves sys-
tem.”82 The district court denied Curves’ motion for summary judgment
on the basis of the reasonable business judgment provision in the
franchise agreement.
Under Armstrong, erroneous judgment could result in a potential
breach of contract claim, even though, as discussed below, Texas law does
not recognize a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. Pursuant
to Armstrong, when a franchisor is granted “discretion” to provide cer-
tain services, a franchisor cannot avoid providing a service altogether
when it would be unreasonable to do so. And a jury will likely decide the
issue of reasonableness. It will be interesting to see if franchisors alter
their franchise agreements to explicitly state that there is no obligation to
provide certain services and whether such changes will affect the outcome
of Armstrong.
Another interpretation of contractual terms was at issue in
76. Id. at *5.
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id. at *5.
79. Id. at *6.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 876 n.47 (Tex. 2014).
82. Armstrong, 2017 WL 894437, at *6.
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Whataburger, Inc. v. Whataburger of Alice, Ltd.,83 where a dispute arose
over the interpretation of a 1993 Settlement Agreement reached when
franchisor Whataburger, Inc. (Whataburger) bought twenty-eight of its
franchisee’s locations in exchange for future development rights. Under
the settlement agreement at issue, Whataburger agreed to buy fran-
chisee’s twenty-eight franchises in Bexar County, Texas in exchange for
giving franchisee “the exclusive right to construct, operate or develop
Whataburger restaurants in Bee, Jim Wells, and Webb Counties.”84 For
each new location, franchisee and Whataburger “shall enter in
[Whataburger]’s standard form of franchise agreement.”85 In addition,
the settlement agreement provided that franchisee would pay 2% of gross
sales as a royalty/advertising fee for each new restaurant in each of the
three designated counties.86
The current dispute began when, in 2013, franchisee, who had twelve
locations at the time, wanted to develop a Whataburger in Laredo, Texas,
and the parties argued about whether franchisee needed Whataburger’s
consent to the selected site.87 Whataburger argued that it had the right to
approve the new site locations “in its sole discretion for any reason.”88
Whataburger stated that it would not approve the new Laredo location
until the franchisee renegotiated franchise agreements for the current
twelve locations, with the twelve renegotiated franchise agreements hav-
ing a 5% royalty/advertising fee and providing that franchisee formally
agreed that Whataburger had site approval rights.89 The district court
granted franchisee’s summary judgment motion, declaring that franchisee
had the sole right to select site locations in Webb and Jim Wells Counties
pursuant to the express terms of the 1993 Settlement Agreement.90 In
addition, the district court determined that the franchise agreements for
the new locations had a royalty/advertising fee of 2% and that the fran-
chisee had the right to renew the terms of the 1993 Settlement Agree-
ment after the franchise agreements for existing locations expired.91
Finally, the district court determined that, as a result of “best efforts” and
“further assurances” clauses in the 1993 Settlement Agreement,
Whataburger owed franchisee duties of candor, loyalty, and good faith.92
On appeal, both parties agreed that the 1993 Settlement Agreement
was unambiguous and therefore the San Antonio Court of Appeals inter-
preted the settlement agreement to “determine the true intent of the par-
83. No. 04-16-00085-CV, 2017 WL 2664437 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 21, 2017,
pet. filed) (mem. op.).
84. Id. at *1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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ties as expressed by the plain language of the agreement.”93 Based on the
plain language of the settlement agreement, the court of appeals agreed
with franchisee on the new locations issue and that franchisee had the
right to select sites for new locations within the designated exclusivity
counties and rejected Whataburger’s argument for the court to consider
the industry practice relating to site selection.94 The court of appeals
stated that:
[w]hile we understand the industry practice may be for a franchisor
to select site locations of new restaurant locations, parties can agree
to terms different than the industry practice [and that] the unambig-
uous language of the 1993 Settlement Agreement grants the right to
designate site locations of new restaurants to the franchisee, not the
franchisor.95
As to the terms of expiring franchise agreements, Whataburger con-
tended on appeal that the “parties did not agree in 1993 to have franchise
agreements running into perpetuity.”96 The court of appeals agreed with
Whataburger on this issue and determined that once a franchise agree-
ment expires by its terms, negotiations must begin anew as to that loca-
tion since Whataburger and franchisee no longer have a contractual
relationship with respect to that location.97 Finally, the court of appeals
agreed with Whataburger that the “best efforts” and “reasonable efforts”
clauses did not create a heightened duty. First, the court of appeals recog-
nized that there is no “implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
Texas contracts.”98 “The franchisor-franchisee relationship does not
amount to a ‘special relationship’ giving rise to heightened duties,”99 and
the “‘best efforts’ clause . . . and the ‘further assurances’ clause [did] not
give rise to heightened dut[ies].”100
“Best efforts” and “reasonable assurances” clauses are rarely defined
by the parties and are often ignored as boilerplate. Further, no bright-line
test can determined when a violation of a “best efforts” clause occurs.
According to Whataburger, “best efforts” does not mean “good faith.”
There is a lack of guidance by Texas courts as to what these clauses really
mean. It will be interesting to see if summary judgment is granted where
the evidence establishes that one party used “no efforts.”
To form a contract, the parties must have a “meeting of the minds” on
the essential terms of the contract.101 In the franchise-context, litigation
involving “meeting of the minds” of essential terms is rare since the
93. Id. at *4 (citing N. Shore Energy, LLC v. Harkins, 501 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Tex.
2016)).
94. Id. at *6–7.
95. Id. at *9.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *11.
98. Id. (citing English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983)).
99. Id.; see Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591,
595–96 (Tex. 1992).
100. Whataburger, 2017 WL 2664437, at *11.
101. David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008).
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franchise agreement is a signed agreement where mutual assent is ex-
pressly stated. However, in Stelutti Kerr, L.L.C. v. Mapei Corporation,102
the issues of contract formation and the essential terms of the contract
were front and center.
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed
the district court’s order granting a judgment as a matter of law for defen-
dant Mapei Corporation (Mapei) after the jury awarded plaintiff Stelluti
Kerr, L.L.C. (SK) about $1.5 million for breach of contract and roughly
$6.1 million for tortious interference.103 In 2006, SK, a machinery distrib-
utor, entered into an agreement with Arodo BVBA (Arodo), a Belgian
corporation, to be Arodo’s non-exclusive, North American distributor of
Arodo’s machine called an Arovac.104 At this time, the Arovac, which
would be used to package cement-based powders used in tile installation,
was only a prototype.105 Later in 2006, “Mapei, a Florida-based manufac-
turer of . . . cement-based tile adhesives, saw the [Arovac] at [a trade]
show and was immediately interested” in purchasing Arovacs.106 A series
of negotiations ensued between Mapei and SK; both parties agreed that a
contract was formed between Mapei and SK in which Mapei agreed to
purchase a certain number of Arovacs from SK, with SK agreeing to sell
the machines to Mapei on an exclusive basis.107 However, the terms of
the contract were at issue, including whether the contract was for the sale
of one Arovac or fourteen Arovacs.108 Mapei accepted delivery of its first
Arovac from SK, but thereafter turned to Arodo directly to supply it with
Arovacs.109 Mapei refused to deal with SK due to a disagreement regard-
ing the number of Arovacs that Mapei had committed to purchase from
SK.110
Thereafter, SK sued both Arodo and Mapei for breach of contract and
tortious interference with existing contract.111 SK’s claims against Arodo
were arbitrated and the claims against Mapei were stayed pending arbi-
tration.112 After the stay was lifted, the case proceeded to trial as to SK’s
claims against Mapei, where the jury found that Mapei had breached a
contract with SK to purchase a total of fourteen Arovacs and had tor-
tiously interfered with its contractual relationship with Arodoa.113 After
the district court granted Mapei’s judgment as a matter of law (JMOL),
SK appealed to the Fifth Circuit, where Mapei filed a renewed motion for
JMOL on SK’s breach of contract claims.
102. No. 16-10430, 2017 WL 2842149 (5th Cir. June 30, 2017).
103. Id. at *6.
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112. Id. at *6.
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The Fifth Circuit rejected each of the three bases asserted in Mapei’s
renewed motion for JMOL on SK’s breach of contract claim. First, the
Fifth Circuit determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s de-
termination that there was a meeting of the minds—that is an offer and
acceptance—for Mapei to purchase a total of fourteen Arovacs from
SK.114 The jury could have found that a price quotation, which contained
the exclusivity provision and requirement for Mapei to purchase fourteen
total Arovacs, was an offer resulting in formation of a contract upon ac-
ceptance, although the price quotation contained a home office approval
clause.115 Despite the general rule that a price quotation is not considered
an offer, the price quotation at issue supported the jury’s implied finding
that the price quotation was an offer, given the “quotation’s level of de-
tail, the extent of prior inquiry, and the number of persons to whom the
quotation was sent.”116 And while the home office approval clause in the
price quotation undermined the jury’s implied finding that the quotation
was an offer, “in light of the extensive dealings and preparations between
these two parties, the jury could conclude this [home office approval]
clause at most created a condition precedent on [SK]’s obligation to per-
form and did not prevent the formation of a contract.”117 As to the ac-
ceptance requirement for a “meeting of the minds,” the fact that the
acceptance “contain[ed] materially different terms than the offer [did]
not mean that it [would] be considered a rejection or counter-offer.”118 In
this case, the Fifth Circuit determined that the jury could have concluded
that the purchase order “did manifest acceptance of the Price Quotation,
even though the terms of the two materially differed.”119
Second, the Fifth Circuit rejected Mapei’s argument that the exclusivity
provision was a dependent promise contingent on Mapei first fulfilling its
promise to purchase thirteen additional machines.120 The price quota-
tion’s exclusivity provision provided that: “‘[i]f the first machine operates
as specified in this order, Mapei agrees and is committed to purchase [13]
subsequent machines’ and ‘SK will grant Mapei exclusivity to the Arovac
[. . .] for its industry.’”121 Given “that the only conditional language in the
. . . exclusivity provision relates to the first Arovac operating as speci-
fied,” the Fifth Circuit determined that the promises were
independent.122
Third, the Fifth Circuit determined that there was some evidence, al-
though “thin,” that Mapei’s board of directors authorized the purchase of
114. Id. at *8–9.
115. Id. at *8.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Crest Ridge Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Newcourt, Inc. 78 F.3d 146, 150 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
118. Id. at *9.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *9–10.
121. Id. at *10.
122. Id.
2018] Franchise Law 197
fourteen Arovacs, rather than just one.123 Because the issue of authority
was not raised in the initial JMOL and SK objected to the lack-of-author-
ity issue not being raised for the first time in the renewed JMOL, the
Fifth Circuit’s review was under the plain error standard, which required
affirmation of “the jury’s implied finding of authority if there is any evi-
dence that supports it.”124
In reversing the JMOL on liability for breach of contract, the Fifth Cir-
cuit determined that “[t]he jury was presented with two alternative, but
plausible, accounts of the formation and authorization of a contract. The
jury reasonably selected one of those alternatives.”125 Therefore, there
was “no basis for setting aside the jury’s verdict on [the] breach of con-
tract claim.”126
To prove an enforceable contract, a party must establish an offer and
acceptance. While an acceptance must generally be clear, indefinite, and
identical to the offer to form a contract, Stelluti Kerr demonstrates that
extensive dealings between two parties can establish a meeting of the
minds, at least in situations where both parties agree that a contract was
formed. And given the parties agreement that some contract was formed,
the Fifth Circuit did not consider whether an enforceable contract really
existed between the parties. The result may have been different if the
existence of a contract was considered.
As to Mapei’s JMOL on the tortious interference claim, the Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed with Mapei that SK had failed to prove that it suffered dam-
ages resulting from Mapei’s alleged interference with SK’s distribution
agreement with Arodo.127 Mapei argued that there was no evidence be-
yond unsupported speculation that SK would have sold more Arovacs as
part of its agreement with Arodo beyond the fourteen machines it had
contracted with Mapei to resell.128 The Fifth Circuit agreed that SK’s ex-
perts had offered no reliable evidence that SK would have made addi-
tional sales.129 As such, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision to grant JMOL on SK’s tortious interference with existing con-
tract claim.130
B. CONTRACT ISSUES—THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING
Texas law does not recognize contractual duties of good faith and fair
dealing; rather, courts will impose such a duty only when a special rela-
123. Id. at *11.
124. Id. at *10.
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tionship exists between the parties.131 And as discussed above in
Whataburger, Texas courts have found no special relationship between
parties to a franchise agreement.132 Texas has enacted statutes, however,
specific to special industries, including automobiles and heavy equipment,
to regulate the contracting parties’ relationship. For example, under the
Texas Occupations Code, manufacturers and dealers of motor vehicles
that enter into a franchise agreement each owe a duty of good faith and
fair dealing to the other party.133 In addition, certain requirements must
be met before a manufacturer may terminate or modify the franchise
agreement, including “good cause” for termination or modification.134 In
Sweeten Truck Center, L.C. v. Volvo Trucks North America,135 discussed
above for its franchise relationship issues, the Austin Court of Appeals
examined whether the Board had considered the appropriate enumerated
statutory factors when it determined that there was good cause for modi-
fication of a franchise agreement that significantly reduced a Volvo fran-
chisee’s AOR.136
In Sweeten, the Board issued a final order adopting the ALJ’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law and added an additional conclusion that
good cause for modification had been established based on three of the
statutory factors listed in Texas Occupations Code § 2301.455(a).137 Spe-
cifically, the Board found that “good cause” had been established based
on: (1) “the dealer’s sales in relation to the sales in the market”; (2) “the
dealer’s investment and obligations”; and (3) “the adequacy of the
dealer’s service facilities, equipment, parts, and personnel in relation to
those of other dealers of new motor vehicles of the same line-make.”138
Under Texas Occupations Code §§ 2301.454(d) and 2301.455(a), the
Board “shall determine whether the manufacturer, distributor, or repre-
sentative has established by a preponderance of the evidence that there is
good cause for the proposed modification” and in making this determina-
tion, the Board “shall consider all existing circumstances.”139 The dealer
argued that this emphasized language required the Board to only focus
on the present situation and that consideration of historical data was
therefore not appropriate.140
The court of appeals rejected the dealer’s interpretation because the
Texas Occupations Code required the Board to consider many factors in
131. City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000); Subaru of Am., Inc.
v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 225 (Tex. 2002).
132. Subaru of Am., 84 S.W.3d at 225; Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l
Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1992).
133. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.478(6) (West 2017) (“Each party to a franchise owes
to the other party a duty of good faith and fair dealing that is actionable in tort.”).
134. Id. § 2301.454(d).
135. No. 03-16-00068-CV, 2016 WL 4979826 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 13, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2301.454(d), 2301.455(a) (West 2017)).
140. Id.
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making a good cause determination, including several factors that re-
quired the Board to compile and examine historical data.141 The court of
appeals determined that accepting the dealer’s interpretation would
mean that “a dealership could nearly always avoid a franchise modifica-
tion by making improvements only after receiving notice of a proposed
modification,” which was “not mandated by the statute’s plain lan-
guage.”142 The court of appeals also found that the weight to be given to
historical data in making the good cause determination was within the
discretion of the Board, and in any event there was no evidence that the
Board did not consider the dealer’s recent improvements.143 Finally, the
court of appeals rejected the dealer’s argument that the possibility of a
future dealership, which the franchisee alleged that Volvo intended to es-
tablish after modifying the franchisee’s AOR, materially diminished the
present value of the franchisee’s investment, because it was mere
speculation.
Dalwadi v. Holiday Hosp. Franchising144 presents a useful reminder
that only breach of contract claims that cite a specific provision that is
breached will survive a motion to dismiss and that fraud claims in federal
court must meet heightened pleading requirements. In this case, a licen-
see sued Holiday Hospitality for breach of contract and fraud, among
other claims, arising from Holiday Inn’s non-renewal of its license to op-
erate a Houston hotel under the Holiday Inn name.145 Plaintiffs “al-
leg[ed] that they spent millions of dollars developing . . . the hotel” even
though “they knew they would be unable to recoup this investment dur-
ing the initial ten-year term” based on the fact that Holiday Hospitality
told them that franchisees get renewed “almost automatically.”146 When
their license was not renewed and Holiday Hospitality licensed a new
hotel in the area, the licensee sued. Holiday Hospitality moved to dismiss
the breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claims for failure to state a claim based on the express language of the
license agreement, which provided that “this License [was] not renewa-
ble” and that only a non-exclusive license was granted.147 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas agreed that licensee could
not state a claim for breach of contract or breach of an implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing under Georgia law, which governed the dis-
pute.148 These claims failed because plaintiffs had “not cited to any spe-
cific contract term entitling [p]laintiffs to renewal or to the issuance of a
new license as the basis for their claim” and “the License Agreement
141. Id.
142. Id. at *3.
143. Id.
144. No. H-16-2588, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213327 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2017). Haynes and
Boone attorneys Deborah S. Coldwell and Sally Dahlstrom represented Holiday Hospital-
ity in this matter.
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id. at *5–10.
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expressly provide[d] that ‘this License is not renewable.’”149 Similarly,
plaintiff’s breach of contract and implied duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing claims based on Holiday Hospitality’s licensing competing hotels in
the same area failed based on the provision in the license agreement that
expressly provided that the license agreement was non-exclusive.150 The
district court also dismissed plaintiffs’ fraud claim under Federal Rule
9(b) after determining that the fraud claims that plaintiffs relied on false
promises were “hopelessly convoluted and conclusory allegations.”151
The district court found that plaintiffs failed to identify who made the
representation, when and how the representation was made, or explain
why the statements were fraudulent so as to satisfy Rule 9(b).152
Dalwadi was decided under Georgia law, which, unlike Texas, recog-
nizes a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. But Dalwadi estab-
lishes that even in states that recognize such duties of good faith and fair
dealing, the duty cannot be invoked to imply terms that contradict the
express terms of a contract. Dalwadi also provides that fraud claims in
federal court will be subject to dismissal if the elements are not articu-
lated with particularity.
C. FIDUCIARY DUTY
CBIF, Limited Partnership v. TGI Friday’s Inc.153 demonstrates what
happens when contractual rights and fiduciary duties overlap. In this case,
TGI Friday’s and CBIF became joint venture (JV) partners in 1995 pur-
suant to a joint venture agreement with the purpose of operating multiple
restaurants in terminals at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport.154 In 2009, the
airport announced its plan to renovate, which required the joint venture
to sign new leases.155 Friday’s initially sued its JV partner CBIF for
breaching fiduciary duties for (1) unreasonably withholding consent
based on its refusal to revise JV governing documents, enter a franchise
agreement, and amend a lease at the DFW Airport; and (2) by acting out
of its own self-interest in threatening the joint venture and its partners
with the total loss of the venture’s business if it was not paid millions of
dollars in order to buy out its interest in the venture.156
149. Id. at *7.
150. Id. at *8–9.
151. Id. at *17.
152. Id. at *14.
153. No. 05-15000157-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3605 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 21,
2017, pet. filed). Haynes and Boone attorneys Deborah S. Coldwell, Nina Cortell, Karen
Precella, and Ryan Paulsen represented TGI Friday’s in the appeal. For a synopsis of the
underlying case and a thorough explanation of the unique issues that franchisors may face
while operating joint ventures at non-traditional venues—such as airports—see Deborah
Coldwell & Katie Dolan-Galaviz, TGI Friday’s Case Highlights Issues at Non-Traditional
Venues, 17 FRANCHISE LAW. 4 (Fall 2014). Ms. Coldwell and Ms. Dolan-Galaviz were
members of the trial team for TGI Friday’s.
154. CBIF Ltd. P’ship, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3605, at *2–3.
155. Id. at *13.
156. Id. at *15.
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At trial, Friday’s sought to dissolve the joint venture, as well as dam-
ages for the breach of fiduciary duty claim and certain declaratory relief
and attorney’s fees.157 CBIF claimed that it could not be held liable for
any “breach of fiduciary duty because it was merely exercising its contrac-
tual right to vote against proposed changes to the venture’s governing
documents and that its refusal to agree to” the changes therefore did “not
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty” because CBIF was merely exercis-
ing its contractual rights.158
The Dallas Court of Appeals, however, affirmed a finding that CBIF
breached its fiduciary duty.159 Importantly, the court held that CBIF’s
argument that it did not breach any duty because it was just enforcing its
contractual rights was incorrect: “[C]ontracts do not exist in a vacuum.
Rather, contractual rights, such as those claimed by CBIF, do not ‘oper-
ate to the exclusion of fiduciary duties.’ . . . Instead, where the two over-
lap, contractual rights must be exercised in a manner consistent with
fiduciary duties.”160
CBIF is a useful reminder that contractual rights do no operate to ex-
clude fiduciary duties. While it is clear that there are no duties of good
faith and fair dealing in Texas contracts, where a special relationship ex-
ists—such as the relationship between joint venturers—contract rights
must not be exercised in a manner that is inconsistent with fiduciary du-
ties. And although CBIF involved a franchisor (but no franchise relation-
ship), the joint venture established the special relationship.
D. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
The “meeting of the minds” element discussed above also often arises
in conspiracy claims, as was the case in TeamLogic, Inc. v. Meredith
Group IT, LLC,161 which was previously discussed for its intellectual
property issues. In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas determined that the complaint adequately alleged a claim
for conspiracy against the franchisee’s principal. Under Texas law, the es-
sential elements of a civil conspiracy claims are: “(1) two or more per-
sons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the
object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5)
damages as the proximate result.”162 Because the complaint alleged that
the principal delayed providing notice to the franchisee’s clients or to the
franchisor of the termination of the franchise agreement and because she
“agreed to ‘look the other way’” as her son and other employees diverted
157. Id.
158. Id. at *37.
159. Id. at *38–39
160. Id. at *37 (quoting Fleming v. Kinney, 395 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citing Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 883–84 (Tex. 2014);
Anderton v. Cawley, 378 S.W.3d 38, 53–54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.)).
161. No. 3:16-CV-2542-BH, 2017 WL 1837114 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2017) (mem. op.).
162. Id. at * 7 (quoting Rodgers v. City of Lancaster Police, No. 3:13-CV-2031-M-BH,
2017 WL 457084, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2017) (quotations omitted).
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customers to her new business, franchisor had sufficiently alleged a claim
for conspiracy against the principal.163
Similarly, the district court made quick work of the two remaining
common law claims for tortious interference with business relationship
and breach of contract. Franchisee argued that the complaint failed to
identify any valid and enforceable contract that franchisee interfered
with.164 In rejecting franchisee’s argument, the district court emphasized
that “[t]ortious interference with a business relationship is a distinct cause
of action from tortious interference with a contract.”165 And although
tortious interference with a contract requires that a party plead and ulti-
mately prove an existing contractual relationship, to establish a claim for
tortious interference with a business relationship, a plaintiff must plead
and ultimately prove:
(1) a reasonable probability that the parties would have entered into
a contract or relationship; (2) an intentional and malicious act by
which the defendant prevented the relationship from occurring, with
the purpose of harming the plaintiff; (3) lack of privilege or justifica-
tion of the defendant to do the act; and (4) actual harm or damage
resulting from the defendant’s interference.166
The district court determined that the allegations that franchisee di-
verted clients to former franchisee’s newly-formed corporation and the
resulting interference with TeamLogic’s relationships with its other fran-
chisees adequately stated a claim for tortious interference with business
relationships.167 These alleged acts by the franchisee also violated the
terms of the franchise agreement, which was enough to state a claim for
breach of contract.168
E. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
In Texas, the economic loss rule generally prohibits recovery in tort for
economic losses resulting from a party’s failure to perform under a con-
tract.169 Thus, a franchisee’s claim that it did not receive the promised
contractual services or benefits, without more, is usually barred by the
economic loss rule. However, claims for fraudulent inducement generally
fall outside the application of the economic loss rule since “it is well es-
tablished that the legal duty not to fraudulently procure a contract is sep-
arate and independent from the duties established by the contract
itself.”170 Thus, although franchisee’s claims for fraudulent inducement
163. Id.
164. Id. at *8.
165. Id.




169. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2007).
170. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41,
46 (Tex. 1998).
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generally survive franchisor’s challenges based on the economic loss rule,
franchisee’s negligent misrepresentation claims do not.
But in QSL Waco, Inc. v. Lube Holdings, Inc.,171 franchisees’ negligent
misrepresentation claim based on franchisor’s representations that caused
franchisees to lose their investment in the franchise survived franchisor’s
motion to dismiss. In this case, franchisees and Quaker State defendants
entered into a franchise agreement for the operation of a “motor-
themed” Quaker State and Lube Restaurant in Waco, Texas.172 After the
Waco location closed less than two years later, franchisees sued the
Quaker State defendants for, among other claims, negligent misrepresen-
tation. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas rejected
franchisor’s argument that the economic loss rule barred franchisees’ neg-
ligent misrepresentation claim.173 In determining whether the economic
loss rule applied, the district court reviewed the nature of the remedy
sought by franchisees.174 Under the economic loss rule, which applies the
independent injury rule, the district court determined that recovery in
tort is precluded when the loss complained of is the subject matter of a
contract between the parties.175 Franchisees argued that the economic
loss rule did not apply to the negligent misrepresentation claim because
franchisees sought recovery of the money they invested as a result of the
alleged misrepresentation.176 The district court agreed with franchisees
because franchisees’ theory of recovery was “based on their out-of-
pocket damages, not the benefit-of-the bargain damages.”177
While the economic loss rule has been narrowed in Texas,178 QSL may
be an outlier. The economic loss rule precludes recovery in tort for eco-
nomic losses that result from a party’s failure to perform a contract when
the harm consists only of the economic loss from the contract. In QSL,
franchisees’ negligent misrepresentation arose from the contractual rela-
tionship between the parties. Although the district court in QSL at-
tempted to distinguish the damages sought as out-of-pocket damages,
such out-of-pocket damages are available for breach of contract. It will be
interesting to see if other courts interpret the independent injury rule in
the same manner. Under QSL, negligent misrepresentation claims arising
out of a contract between the parties would be barred to the extent a
plaintiff sought expectancy damages (benefit of the bargain), but would
not be barred to the extent a plaintiff sought reliance (out of pocket) and
possibly restitution (quantum meruit) damages.
171. No. 4:14CV591-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 3405039 (E.D. Tex. July 10, 2017).
172. Id. at *1.
173. Id. at *4.
174. Id. at *3.
175. Id. at *3–4
176. Id. at *4.
177. Id.
178. Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dall. Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2014)
(economic loss rule does not bar all claims arising out of contractual setting).
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V. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS UNIFORM TRADE SECRET ACT
In Lifesize, Inc. v. Chimene, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas confirmed that acquisition of trade secrets through im-
proper means is not the only path to a violation under the Texas Uniform
Trade Secret Act (TUTSA) and that use or disclosure of the trade secrets,
when one knew that they were under a duty not to do so, also violates the
TUTSA.179
Prior to September 1, 2013 when TUTSA was enacted, franchisors and
other owners of trade secrets were faced with inconsistent common law
definition of “trade secrets” and inconsistent common law claims. Now
the definition of “trade secret” is provided by TUTSA. In May 2016, the
U.S. Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), a federal
law that creates a civil cause of action for misappropriation of trade
secrets. In the 2017 Texas Legislative Session, the state legislature intro-
duced House Bill 1995 in part to amend TUTSA to make some of its
provisions consistent with DTSA. The amendment, which became effec-
tive September 1, 2017, made several changes to the definitions in
TUTSA. The definition of “trade secrets” is now aligned with the defini-
tion in DTSA as follows:
“Trade secret” means all forms and types of information, including
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information,
and any formula, design, prototype, pattern, plan, compilation, pro-
gram device, program, code, device, method, technique, process, pro-
cedure, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or
suppliers, whether tangible or intangible and whether or how stored,
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing.180
This revised trade secret definition is different from the definition
found in DTSA in one important respect. While DTSA limits a trade
secret to “financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineer-
ing information,”181 TUTSA’s revised definition provides that a trade se-
cret is any form or type of information and specifically lists “business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information” as examples.
In addition, TUTSA includes “a list of potential customers or suppliers”
as an example of trade secret information. Under the current TUTSA,
this information is protected only if:
(A) the owner of the trade secret has taken reasonable measures
under the circumstances to keep the information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person
179. Lifesize, Inc. v. Chimene, No. 1:16-CV-1109-RP, 2017 WL 1532609, at *1–2 (W.D.
Tex. Apr. 26, 2017).
180. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002(6) (West 2017).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
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who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information.182
The amended TUTSA also clarifies the proper scope and limits for in-
junctive relief. While actual or threatened misappropriation can be en-
joined, the amended TUTSA now indicates that an injunctive order
should “not prohibit a person from using general knowledge, skill, and
experience that person acquired during employment.”183 The amended
TUTSA also defines “willful and malicious misappropriation” to obtain
exemplary damages and requires “clear and convincing” evidence to
show willful and malicious misappropriation.184 Furthermore, the amend-
ment defines a trade secret “owner,” which is either someone holding
legal or equitable title or someone holding rights of enforcement.185 Fi-
nally, the amendment codifies a seven-factor balancing test that courts
should consider before excluding a party from the courtroom while dis-
cussing trade secrets, a test adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in In re
M-I L.L.C.186
As discussed in Lifesize, TUTSA defines misappropriation as acquisi-
tion of the trade secret through improper means or in circumstances
where a defendant knows that “he obtained the information in circum-
stances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy.”187 Thus, although the
former employee in Lifesize did not acquire the trade secrets at issue by
improper means because his initial access was with the permission of his
employer, acquisition by improper means is “not the sole path to liabil-
ity” under the express language of TUTSA.188 Rather, pursuant to the
express language of TUTSA, misappropriation also occurs when “at the
time of the unauthorized use or disclosure of the information, the defen-
dant knew he obtained the information in circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy.”189 Thus, even though the former employee
initially acquired the trade secrets by proper means, misappropriation can
occur when the defendant “later disclosed or used the information in vio-
lation of that confidence.”190 As such, allegations that the former em-
ployee signed confidentiality agreements were sufficient to show that the
former employee understood that he was under a duty to maintain confi-
dentiality and to state a claim for misappropriation under TUTSA.191
TUTSA offers a clear definition of what constitutes trade secrets. In
2017, TUTSA was amended in part to align the Texas trade secret defini-
tion with the federal one in DTSA. These amendments bring TUTSA
182. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002(6)(A)–(B).
183. Id. § 134A.003(a).
184. Id. § 134A.002(7), .004(b).
185. Id. § 134A.002(3-a).
186. 505 S.W.3d 569 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.006).
187. Lifesize, Inc. v. Chimene, No. 1:16-CV-1109-RP, 2017 WL 1532609, at *9 (citing
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closer to DTSA, but key differences remain. For example, the Texas defi-
nition of “trade secret” is broader, which might result in forum shopping.
It will be interesting to follow how Texas courts will interpret these
changes. In addition, Lifesize reminds us that an employee who obtains
trade secret information under a non-disclosure agreement can be liable
under TUTSA if he discloses that information to a competitor.
B. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
Generally, a franchisee qualifies as a “consumer” under the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).192 As such, franchisors have been
subject to the application of the DTPA, with the resulting ability that
franchisees can assert claims for treble damages and recover attorneys’
fees.
The DTPA provides five types of wrongful conduct that support a con-
sumer’s lawsuit: (1) deceptive acts or practices; (2) breach of warranty;
(3) unconscionable acts; (4) violations of the Texas Insurance Code; and
(5) violations of tie-in statutes.193 Autobahn Imports, L.P. v. Jaguar Land
Rover North America, LLC194 is a useful reminder of potential tie-in lia-
bility for franchised dealerships under the DTPA. And with this tie-in
liability, treble damages and attorneys’ fees become available.
In Autobahn Imports, a dispute arose between Autobahn Imports, L.P.
(Autobahn), a Jaguar dealership, and Jaguar Land Rover North America,
LLC (Jaguar) over whether the manufacturer’s incentive-based sales pro-
gram that was partially dependent on dealer sales applied to sales made
to leasing companies.195 After Jaguar performed an audit and “charged-
back against Autobahn” about $317,000 for benefits it had received for
selling vehicles to leasing companies, the dealership launched an adminis-
trative claim against Jaguar before the Board.196 The Board determined
that Jaguar inappropriately charged back the dealership $317,000 in viola-
tion of Section 2301 of the Texas Occupations Code and then Jaguar ap-
pealed to state court.197 While Jaguar’s state court appeal was pending,
Autobahn initiated a separate action in state court for violations of the
DTPA by virtue of the DTPA tie-in statute contained in the Texas Occu-
pations Code and for breach of contract.198 After Jaguar removed to fed-
eral court, Autobahn sought summary judgment on its DTPA claim,
breach of contract claim, and claim for attorneys’ fees under the
DTPA.199 “Jaguar’s main resistance” to Autobahn’s summary judgment
192. AdvoCare Int’l, L.P. v. Ford, No. 05-10-00590-CV, 2013 WL 505210, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 5, 2013, pet. denied).
193. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)–(4), (h) (West 2017).
194. No. 4:16-CV-1172-A, 2017 WL 2684055 (W.D. Tex. June 20, 2017).
195. Id. at *1.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *1–2.
199. Id. at *2.
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motion was that “Autobahn [had] not exhausted its administrative reme-
dies” because the appeal from the Board was still pending.200 After re-
jecting Jaguar’s exhaustion arguments, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas determined that the findings of facts and con-
clusions of law in the Board’s final order established as a matter of law
that Autobahn is entitled to economic damages under the DTPA.201 In
addition, the district court also found as a matter of law that “Jaguar’s
conduct was ‘committed knowingly,’” and that Autobahn was therefore
“entitled to receive as damages from Jaguar treble its economic damages”
under the DTPA.202 The district court made this determination based on
the Board’s findings and conclusions regarding the “committed know-
ingly” element, as well as Jaguar’s subsequent conduct in continuing to
withhold money it acquired through unlawful chargebacks.203 The district
court explained that “‘[k]nowingly,’ as defined . . . means ‘actual aware-
ness, at the time of the act or practice complained of, of the falsity, decep-
tion, or unfairness of the act . . .’”204 In other words, “knowingly” under
the DTPA occurs when “a person knows what he is doing is false, decep-
tive, or unfair” but decides to do it anyway.205 For the same reasons that
Autobahn was entitled to summary judgment on the DTPA claim, the
district court also granted summary judgment on Autobahn’s breach of
contract claim.206 But because the contract damages were based on the
same harm, Autobahn was not entitled to double recovery.207
As a result of tie-in statutes such as those applicable to motor vehicle
dealerships, the DTPA has a reach that goes beyond the language of the
DTPA itself. As illustrated by Autobahn Imports, DTPA tie-in can result
in the same economic and treble damages authorized by the DTPA.
C. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Most franchise agreements contain covenants not to compete that pro-
hibit a franchisee’s involvement in competing businesses during the term
of the franchise and for a time period following termination or expiration
of the franchise agreement. After the franchise relationship ends, most
non-competes prohibit the former franchisee from operating a competing
business at the former franchise site or within a specified distance from
other franchised locations. Texas courts will enforce a non-compete
agreement as long as it complies with the Covenants Not to Compete
Act, Texas Business and Commerce Code § 15.50. This statute provides
that a covenant-not-to-compete will be enforced if:
200. Id. at *5.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *6.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., Inc. v. Dal-Worth Tank Co., 974
S.W.2d 51, 53–54 (Tex. 1998)).
206. Id. at *7.
207. Id.
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it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the
time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations
as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained
that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is nec-
essary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
promisee.208
In Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. Mosley,209 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas examined the reasonableness of a five-
mile restriction on competition. Fantastic Sams, a hair salon franchisor,
and Mosley were parties to a franchise agreement that was not renewed
and expired after an eleven-year relationship.210 After the franchise
agreement expired, Mosley opened a new salon about two miles from his
prior location in Cypress, Texas.211 Fantastic Sams then sought to enforce
the non-compete provision in the franchise agreement, which prohibited
the former franchisee from owning or operating a competing hair salon
within five miles of the former Fantastic Sams’ franchise for two years.212
Fantastic Sams sought a preliminary injunction barring Mosley from com-
peting within the five mile radius and from using its trademarks.213 The
district court found the non-compete enforceable. First, it rejected the
franchisee’s argument that the non-compete agreement was not ancillary
or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement.214 The franchisee argued
that there was no consideration given, making the non-compete unen-
forceable. The district court explained that in order “to be considered
‘ancillary’ to an ‘otherwise enforceable agreement,’” the following two
elements must be met: “(1) consideration given to the otherwise enforce-
able agreement must give rise to the party’s interest in restraining compe-
tition, and (2) the covenant must be designed to enforce the returned
consideration or promise.”215 The district court determined that fran-
chisee received “proprietary and confidential information in the form of
training, business models, and operations manuals” and “also received an
exclusivity commitment.”216 As such, these benefits gave rise to Fantastic
Sams’ interest in restraining the former franchise from competition and
were given in exchange for the non-compete promise.217
Second, the district court determined that the non-compete was rea-
sonably limited as to time, geographic area, and scope of activity.218 The
franchisee did not argue that the two-year time restriction was unreason-
208. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (West 2017).
209. No. H-16-2318, 2016 WL 7426403 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2016) (mem. op.).
210. Id. at *1.
211. Id.
212. Id. at *3.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *4.
215. Id. (citing Ray Mart, Inc. v. Stock Bldg. Supply of Tex., L.P., 302 Fed. App’x 237,
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able and only contested the five-mile radius restriction, arguing that it
was inequitable because Fantastic Sams could “license another franchise
location within 0.5 miles under the [franchise] [a]greement.219 The district
court rejected the franchisee’s argument and determined that a non-com-
pete “does not need to be fully equitable to be reasonable.”220 Because
the district court determined that a five-mile radius was a “fairly small
geographic area,” the district court concluded that the geographic scope
limitations were reasonable.221
As set forth above, to be enforceable under the Texas Covenants Not
to Compete Act, non-competes must be reasonably limited “as to time,
geographical area, and scope” and “not impose a greater restraint than is
necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the prom-
isee.”222 In the franchise relationship, examples of legitimate interests in-
clude goodwill, trade secrets, and confidential and proprietary
information. Non-competes are necessary to protect the franchise system
from unfair competition, and as Fantastic Sams illustrates, these cove-
nants will be enforced as determined on a case-by-case basis. In addition,
Fantastic Sams demonstrates that the reasonableness of the geographic
limitation is not judged based on the territory radius for the franchised
location.
D. BANKRUPTCY
Collateral estoppel prevents a party from re-litigating identical issues
of fact or law that were actually litigated and essential to the final judg-
ment in a prior suit.223 The application of collateral estoppel applies to
adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court where bankruptcy courts give
full faith and credit to prior state-court judgments. But state courts can
also apply collateral estoppel to bankruptcy court findings to preclude a
franchisee’s common law claims, as was demonstrated in BP Automotive
LP v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, LLC.224 This case involved a failed asset
purchase agreement for the sale of assets of a car dealership located in
Waxahachie, Texas. The previous actions of BP Automotive relating to
the current controversy have been partially litigated in several hearings in
bankruptcy court, appeals of the bankruptcy court findings, additional ap-
peals of federal court rulings, and a state court suit, which resulted in
summary judgments that were appealed.225 The current appeal consid-
ered in BP Automotive involved the collateral estoppel effect of the
bankruptcy court’s findings on the dealership’s state court claims.
In 2009, BP Automotive LP (Automotive) and RML Dodge entered




222. Id. at *3.
223. State & Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. 2001).
224. 517 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.).
225. Id. at 191–92.
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tive would sell its assets, including its Chrysler and Dodge franchises.226
One condition of the deal was that RML Dodge would enter into a lease
with the real estate holding company (BPRE), whose ownership was
identical to Automotive’s, “for the land and improvements on which Au-
tomotive operated its dealership.”227 Another condition of the deal was
that RML Dodge would seek the approval of Chrysler Motor, L.L.C.
(Old Chrysler).228 Old Chrysler thereafter filed for bankruptcy and re-
jected Automotive’s franchise agreement as part of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.229 The asset purchase agreement never closed and the
associated lease with BPRE never came into effect.230 Subsequently, the
reorganized Chrysler awarded RML Dodge a franchise agreement in
Waxahachie for “not only the Chrysler and Dodge franchises previously
owned by Automotive, but also the Jeep franchise.”231 Automotive as-
serts that RML Dodge delayed closing the asset purchase agreement be-
cause RML Dodge had “insider information” regarding Old Chrysler’s
bankruptcy, a desire to obtain a Jeep franchise that RML Dodge did not
disclose to Automotive, and RML Dodge’s insider deal to obtain the
Chrysler, Dodge, and Jeep franchises from the reorganized Chrysler.232
BPRE then filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and asserted an
adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case against RML Dodge for
breach of contract, tortious interference with a prospective business rela-
tionship, fraud, unfair competition by misappropriation, and several other
causes of action.233 Automotive filed a petition in state court against
RML Dodge, which was almost identical to the adversary complaint filed
by BPRE in the bankruptcy case.234 In 2010, the bankruptcy court, after a
trial on the merits, found against BPRE on all of its causes of action as-
serted in the adversary proceeding.235 After the bankruptcy judgment
was entered, the opinion was appealed and finally affirmed by the U.S
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2015.236 Based on the bank-
ruptcy court’s take-nothing judgment against BPRE, the state court
granted RML Dodge’s motion for summary judgment on Automotive’s
claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and fraud based on collat-
eral estoppel. Subsequently, the Freestone County District Court granted
RML’s motion for summary judgment on Automotive’s tortious interfer-
ence and unfair competition claims, but did not state the basis for its rul-
ing.237 The Texarkana Court of Appeals considered whether the district
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court properly granted summary judgment based on the application of
collateral estoppel to the bankruptcy court’s earlier decision involving
BPRE.
First, determining that collateral estoppel precluded Automotive’s
claims for breach of contract, fraud, and unfair competition by misappro-
priation, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s summary judg-
ment as to these claims.238 Under both state and federal law, collateral
estoppel has the following three elements: “(1) the facts sought to be liti-
gated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action;
(2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3)
the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.”239 In addition, the
issues in the first and second actions must be “identical,” although the
causes of action may be different.240 In order to be cast adversaries in the
first suit, “it is only necessary that the party against whom the doctrine is
asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the first action.”241 In
determining that collateral estoppel precluded Automotive’s claims for
breach of contract, fraud, and unfair competition by misappropriation,
the court of appeals first determined that Automotive and BPRE were in
privity for the purposes of collateral estoppel “since the owners of both
companies controlled and fully participated in the prior litigation and be-
cause Automotive’s interest in establishing” the breach of contract, fraud,
and unfair competition claims “was fully represented by BPRE in the
adversary proceeding.”242 The court of appeals then determined that the
issues were identical, that the bankruptcy court’s findings were essential,
and that the issues were fully and fairly litigated in the bankruptcy
court.243 As such, Automotive’s claims for breach of contract, fraud, and
unfair competition by misappropriation were precluded by the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel.
As to the tortious interference with prospective business relations
claim, however, the court of appeals found that collateral estoppel could
not be applied because the bankruptcy court did not make any findings
essential to its judgment as to the tortious interference with business rela-
tions claim.244 The bankruptcy courts findings were not essential to its
judgment because the factual basis for Automotive’s claims in the state
court was not based on the failure of RML Dodge to execute the asset
purchase agreement and leases, but on RML Dodge’s alleged interfer-
ence with the sale of Automotive’s service equipment to a third party.245
238. Id. at 200–08.
239. Id. at 199 (quoting Nu-Way Energy Corp. v. Delp, 205 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied) (quotations omitted)).
240. Id. at 200.
241. Id. (quoting Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 800 S.W.2d 796, 801–02 (Tex. 1994)
(quotations omitted) (emphasis removed)).
242. Id. at 203 (citing HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 890 (Tex. 1999)).
243. Id. at 203–205.
244. Id. at 209.
245. Id.
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Although procedurally complicated, BP Automotive is a useful re-
minder of the collateral effect of judgment rendered by a bankruptcy
court, which can preclude state court actions. Texas does not require that
the parties be identical for collateral estoppel to apply—only that privity
exists. Thus, where a franchisee is associated with other related entities
with common ownership, franchisee and the related entities should con-
sider the potential collateral estoppel effects of any anticipated adversary
proceeding before filing for bankruptcy. Because the franchisee could po-
tentially lose the right to assert claims against the franchisor if its related
entity is unsuccessful in any adversary proceeding involving the
franchisor.
VI. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Armstrong I, discussed above for contractual interpretation issues,
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Curves’
summary judgment on franchisees’ sole-remaining claim for breach of
contract. In Armstrong II, after a jury trial and verdict, the district court
explained the evidence necessary to establish lost profits.246 In Armstrong
II, “[t]he jury awarded damages [on the breach of contract claim] to each
[p]laintiff that reported losses on their income tax returns in the respec-
tive, equivalent amounts.”247 In its motion for judgment as a matter of
law, Curves argued that “income tax returns were incompetent proof of
causation and damages and . . . thus the jury’s verdict was arbitrary.”248
The district court reiterated that lost profits “must be shown by compe-
tent evidence with reasonable certainty” and “[a]t a minimum, opinions
or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective, facts, figures or
data from which the amount can be ascertained.”249 Plaintiffs presented
the following evidence supporting their lost profits: (1) tax returns; (2)
Curves’ statements regarding expected profit when a franchise owner op-
erated according to the Curves system; (3) plaintiffs’ testimony about the
operation of their franchises and their adherence to the Curves system;
and (4) plaintiffs’ testimony about the lack of support and promotions
received from the franchise.250 The district court held that was enough for
the jury to conclude that the income tax returns demonstrated loss.251
246. Armstrong v. Curves Int’l, Inc. (Armstrong II), No. 15-294, 2017 WL 5256997, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017).
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id. Curves also argued that the income tax returns were inadmissible hearsay, but
because Curves did not raise this argument at the time of trial, the court did not consider
the argument. In addition, the court held that this argument would not serve as the basis of
a successful motion for new trial.
249. Id. at *3; see ERI Consulting Engr’s, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 876–80 (Tex.
2010).
250. Armstrong II, 2017 WL 5256997, at *3.
251. Id.
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Curves also argued that the jury could not find causation as to the
amount of damages awarded because plaintiffs offered no expert opinion
as to damages.252 In determining whether expert testimony was required,
the district court determined that “[u]nless the issues concerning lost
profits are ‘highly technical,’ expert testimony is not required.”253 As
such, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ testimony on the operation
of the Curves facilities, historical net profits, and evidence of decline and
losses was enough.254 The district court acknowledged that new ventures
face a more difficult burden to show that the lost profits claimed are not
“too uncertain or speculative.”255 As to the newer-franchise-owner plain-
tiffs, evidence that Curves’ principal told these franchisees that they could
reasonably expect to realize net operating profits and that franchises
were profitable was sufficient to support the jury’s implicit finding that
the lost profits claim was not too uncertain or speculative.256
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Franchisors have increasingly sought injunctive relief and the courts
have increasingly granted injunctive relief in Texas. In Mr. Rooter LLC v.
Akhoian, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas con-
firmed that even when a franchise agreement contains an arbitration pro-
vision, certain disputes, such as a preliminary injunction, may be brought
in court in limited circumstances opening up the possibility for the grant-
ing of more preliminary injunctions.257 Here, the district court held that
even when a franchise agreement contains a clear provision to arbitrate,
when the agreement also contains a provision for emergency relief
outside of arbitration, a party may seek an injunction bypassing
arbitration.258
In Fantastic Sams Franchise Corporation v. Mosley, discussed above for
the enforceability of non-compete clauses, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction to a plaintiff-
franchisor to enforce post-termination and non-compete provisions of its
franchise agreement.259 After determining that the non-compete was en-
forceable, the district court turned to whether Fantastic Sams was entitled
to a preliminary injunction. The post-termination provision of the
franchise agreement required the franchisee to “cease using Fantastic
Sams’ marks and trade dress, to transfer the telephone numbers he used
while operating the Fantastic Sams salon, and to not conduct business
252. Id. at *4.
253. Id.
254. Id. at *5.
255. Id. (quoting Sw. Battery Corp. v. Owen, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (Tex. 1938)).
256. Id.
257. Mr. Rooter v. Akhoian, No. W-16-CA-00433-RP, 2017 WL 5240886, *1–2 (W.D.
Tex. Jan. 30, 2017).
258. Id.
259. Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. Mosley, No. H-16-2318, 2016 WL 7426403, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2016).
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that gives the public the impression that the Agreement is in force.”260
First, the district court determined that Fantastic Sams was likely to
succeed on its breach of contract claim that Mosley violated his post-ter-
mination obligations under the franchise agreement.261 The district court
concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that Mosley would be
found to have breached these obligations because he continued to use the
same telephone number, the online yellow page listing identified the new
location as a Fantastic Sams, his cosmetology license was still under the
Fantastic Sams’ name, and customer receipts and bank statements re-
flected Fantastic Sams.262 In addition, the district court determined that it
was substantially likely that Mosley would be found in violation of the
enforceable non-compete discussed above.263 Second, the district court
also determined that Fantastic Sams had established the element of irrep-
arable harm.264 The district court agreed that Mosley’s continued opera-
tion of a nearby salon, which prevented Fantastic Sams from licensing a
new franchise in the area, caused irreparable harm to Fantastic Sams,
which could not be remedied with damages.265 As such, the district court
granted the preliminary injunction with respect to the non-compete and
related violations of the termination provisions.266 In weighing the bal-
ancing of hardships, the third factor in determining whether a preliminary
injunction should be granted, the district court interestingly gave signifi-
cant weight to the fact that although willing, franchisee had failed to com-
ply with the easy-to-accomplish post-termination provisions such as
transferring the phone, correcting the receipts, and removing identifica-
tion materials related to Fantastic Sams, as well as the fact that the fran-
chisee’s hardship was self-induced by opening a salon in violation of the
non-compete.267 Finally, the district court held that the public interest
factor favored valid non-competes to increase efficiency and business per-
formance.268 Thus, the district court granted the preliminary injunction
with respect to the non-compete and related violations of the post-termi-
nation provisions.269
With regard to the trademark and trade dress violations, however, the
district court did not grant the preliminary injunction.270 On both counts,
the district court held that the franchisor had not established a substantial
likelihood on the merits to succeed on a preliminary injunction.271
260. Id. at *3.
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In Dickey’s Barbecue Pit, Inc. v. Celebrated Affairs Catering, Inc., the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas found that the
franchisor established all of the elements necessary for a preliminary in-
junction to prevent a former franchisee from use of the franchisor’s trade-
marks after the termination of the franchise agreement.272 In this case,
the franchise agreement specifically required the franchisee to cease use
of the franchisor’s marks following the termination of the franchise
agreement, so the franchisee’s continued use of the franchisor’s marks
showed a likelihood of success on the merits.273 The district court held
that the franchisee’s continued use of the mark amounted to actual and
imminent harm and that the franchisor’s “loss of control over the mark
led to loss of goodwill, reputation, or customer confusion.”274 In addition,
the district court held that the balance of hardships weighed in favor of
granting the injunction and that the public interest of the public not to be
confused or deceived by the franchisee’s continued use of the franchise’s
marks also weighed in favor of granting the injunction.275
Interestingly, the injunction included requirements that the franchisee:
(1) deliver to the franchisor all inventory or merchandise bearing the
franchise mark or a confusing mark; (2) supply the franchisor with a list
of downstream purchasers of products from the restaurants along with
related correspondence, invoices, and receipts; (3) file to the court and
serve on the franchisor within 10 days a report detailing the manner they
have complied with the order; and (4) submit an accounting to franchisor
of all gains, profits, and advantages derived from the unauthorized use of
the franchise’s marks.276 This example shows the onerous requirements
that a preliminary injunction in the franchise context might impose.
Though these cases indicate that preliminary injunctions are a vehicle
increasingly used in franchise cases, ultimately preliminary injunctions in
franchise cases must be narrowly tailored and the party requesting the
preliminary injunction bears a high burden.
As discussed above, in Stockade Companies, LLC v. Kelly Restaurant
Group, LLC, the franchisor-plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin a former
franchisee from: (1) “using [its] confidential information in violation of
the parties’ [f]ranchise [a]greement” with respect to the buffet system
setup of the newly rebranded restaurants; (2) “misappropriating [its]
trade secrets in violation of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act”; and
(3) “infringing on [the franchise’s] trade dress in violation of the Lanham
Act.”277 The plaintiff’s high burden of establishing that a trade secret was
discovered through improper means and that confidential information
272. Dickey’s Barbecue Pit, Inc. v. Celebrated Affairs Catering, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-
00127, 2017 WL 1079431, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2017) (mem. op.).
273. Id. at *2–3.
274. Id. at *4.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 5.
277. Stockade Cos., LLC v. Kelly Rest. Grp., LLC, No. 1:17-CV-143-RP, 2017 WL
4640443, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
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was used demonstrates that a preliminary injunction for such types of
violations will only issue where the plaintiff shows direct evidence of a
violation. In addition, plaintiff’s failure to allege a use of trade dress es-
tablishes the specificity with which franchisors must allege claims to suc-
ceed on receiving injunctive relief.
C. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In Prescription Health Network, LLC v. Adams, discussed above in
Section IV, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
confirmation of an arbitration award, which granted the franchisee attor-
neys’ fees as the “prevailing party.”278 The court, with very little discus-
sion, affirmed the attorneys’ fees award even though franchisees only
won on two of the ten claims.279 This case demonstrates that a plaintiff
need not win on all counts to receive a large attorneys’ fees award, even
an award far exceeding the total of damages recovered by the plaintiff.280
278. Prescription Health Network, LLC v. Adams, No. 02-15-00279-CV, 2017 WL
1416875, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet. denied).
279. Id.
280. Id.
